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1 "Exploring ways to improve the sovereign debt restructuring process is a key part of the international community's efforts to strengthen the architecture of the global financial system." Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.
Introduction
The recent and spectacular financial distresses of sovereign states of large emerging economies, e.g. Mexico (1995 ), East Asia (1997 , Russia (1998) and Argentina (2002) have raised growing concerns regarding the economic inefficiency of the current international legal frames of sovereign debts. The debate that emerged, have been reconsidering the international financial architecture and the implementation of reforms that would help improve financial distress workouts of sovereign debtors. If there is a general agreement on supporting collective action among lenders similarly to English & Welsh law that requires a majority of debt holders (usually 75%) to modify repayment terms, opinions still diverge regarding its implementation.
The contractual approach suggests that the so-called collective action clause (CAC) would either become a standard covenant included in bond contracts (e.g. Yianni (1999) , Eichengreen and Mody (2000b) , Buchheit and Gulati (2002) , Kletzer (2002) ) or be introduced through amendments in major governing laws. In either of the two forms, the financial community supports this solution. 1 The statutory approach suggests instead the creation of an official Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). An independent supervisory agency would be established, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) being a suitable candidate through the modification of its statutes. This solution is strongly supported by Anne O. Kruger, IMF first deputy managing director (Krueger (2002) ; see also Bolton and Jeanne (2002) ). A key difference between these approaches resides in the way decisions will be taken. While clauses bind holders only within the same bond issue, the SDRM would allow 2 for different bond instruments to be aggregated into one single vote on the proposed restructuring, as in commercial debt restructuring (see e.g. White (2002) for a valuable discussion of the two approaches).
I believe that the outcome of each of these propositions depends to a large extent on the variation in the protection of the rights of creditors among the various laws. Indeed, maintaining unbalanced creditor rights protection is likely to result in hazardous restructurings. For instance, holders of debts governed by strong creditors rights protection may block any restructuring because the value of their collateral is implicitly larger. As a consequence, the distressed sovereign will offer larger compensations than it would necessary be otherwise in order to prevent an official default due to a minority of creditors. In this case, the contractual collective-action clause (so-called, CAC) would be insufficient and might become in some cases counter-productive. Hence, I believe the thorough understanding of creditor rights under each law is essential. Nevertheless, in its attempt to provide enhanced protections to sovereign debtors, the current debate has dismissed this point. This paper suggests bridging the gap.
What actually happens today is that ad-hoc national laws govern sovereign debt contracts. The so-called governing law constitutes the only legal frame for every individual debt contract. Although the immunity of foreign states remains the general rule, major governing laws are inclined to breach the doctrine of sovereignty and adopt the restrictive doctrine of foreign state immunity. Provisions mainly apply to commercial activities which states carry out abroad. Unlike corporate debts, the governing laws of sovereign debts have strong implications on the restructuring and the enforcement of the terms of the contract (Wood (1995) ). Beyond that, the governing laws are conflicting if not competing, which is 3 not the case for firms, which may opt to submit to the jurisdiction they like (Ayotte and Skeele (2002) ).
I find evidence that the governing law is indeed selected in order to favour the lenders' ability to take legal action against the sovereign defaulter. Hence, the relevance of the governing law seems to be a prerequisite to gain access to international capital markets. The second result is tha t the credibility and the enforcement costs associated with each law will have an impact on the size of the debts (yearly and relative to GNP). The two major governing laws, namely England and New York do not present substantial differences though.
Therefore, I believe the contractual approach should not suffer from unbalanced bargaining power among lenders. It would indeed constitute a first major step in the sense of the improvement of the economic efficiency of international financial architecture.
The results are consistent with previous evidence suggesting that the asset value and contracted amounts are larger under laws that provide stronger creditors rights and enforcement (e.g. La Porta et al. (1999) , Fabbri and Padula (2001) ). 2 The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of threats of commercial penalty motivates the presence of sovereign debts (Bulow and Rogof (1989) , Rose (2002) ).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 makes a comparative analysis of national laws and jurisprudence, with a comprehensive survey of the US and English&Welsh codes. Section 3 draws the consequences for the choice of the governing law and its determinants. Section 4 then presents the sample of sovereign public issues and descriptive elements of the governing laws. Section 5 presents the results and the robustness tests. In the last section I summarise the results and provide concluding remarks. (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, […] Any entity involved by this definition of foreign state thus benefits of sovereign immunity unless restrictions apply. This is actually a rather broad definition of a foreign state that covers most of public firms.
Commercial activity. In the FSIA, there is ambiguity in the definition of the commercial activity itself which constitutes the core paragraph of the act since it determines the exception for which the state is not immune. A commercial activity must be carried on in the US by a foreign state. This is defined as follows:
(d) A "commercial activity" means either a regular course or commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. (e) A "commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state" means commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the United States.
Hence commercial activity means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character is determined by the nature of the conduct or act, and not its purpose. It is however unclear whether a loan contracted by a state should be deemed as a commercial transaction.
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A contact presumably includes negotiation and signature of financial contracts involving US creditors or merely repayable in the US. It is questionable whether the term contact also involves any dollar denominated lend ing. Interestingly, although interpretations generally involve financial contracts that enter the exception clauses, attempts to amend the code in a specification purpose, especially the amendment proposed by Senator Mathias in 1984 (which followed the UK Sovereign Immunity Act 1978, more specific on this matter) was rejected.
The statement was the following:
any promise to pay made by a foreign state, any debt security issued by a foreign state, and any guarantee by a foreign state of a promise to pay made by another party 4 The act has been amended in 1988 though, introducing the following statement: 5 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A) (6)in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court under this section or section 1 607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable.
Therefore, ambiguities regarding the financial contracts have been left out by the legislator. The Allied case jurisprudence actually predicts that the loss of time consecutive to the ambiguity of the FSIA give time for politics to reflect on the case. Indeed, the argument for dismissal of the Act of State doctrine was denied by the government only several years later and concluded the debate (Leigh (1984) and Greenwood and Mercer (1995) 
The selection of the governing law of sovereign debts
The comparative law analysis presented in the previous section yields several implications. First, the enforcement of the terms of a sovereign loan contract is apparently contingent on various features of the contract itself with respect to the governing law, e.g. 
3.a. Is the governing law designed according to its enforcement power?
The analysis of the design of the governing law of sovereign international bonds will provide first evidence of whether the governing law functions as an enforcement device in sovereign debt markets. Following the survey provided here above, I suggest a combined survey of the governing law, the currency of denomination, and the countries where the liability is traded. Indeed, on the one hand, the law of the country where it is traded does not necessarily govern the bond. On the other hand, it may actually be traded in more than one market. As I showed in section 2, currency denomination and listing are the main factors of the probability of the law enforcement effectiveness.
The results should be interpreted in the following manner. The application of England law is not contingent on neither the place of listing nor the currency of denomination. Instead, New York law needs a direct impact on the US. Therefore most of debts that are governed by US law are either in US dollars or traded in the US. The same result applies to Swiss law, which requires substantial linkage with Switzerland. On the other hand, Japan law has no restrictive elements of foreign states immunity and therefore it will not be designed, should the governing law matter.
Broadly speaking, the context in which governing laws are selected predicts their importance in international as well as in domestic markets. The analysis is however insufficient. I will complete the analysis by exploring whether the amounts raised under different governing laws are significantly different.
3.b. Does jurisdiction shopping 8 allow for larger foreign credits availability?
Assuming that the enforcement credibility of the governing law is real, the sovereign agent will raise more or less under the diverse governing laws. Indeed, following the 12 hypothesis that the low enforcement power of the contract terms has a credit rationing effect, I
expect the weak laws to allow for lower amounts. To investigate this hypothesis, I suggest the following statistical model: j,ki,j,k 1i,j,k2i,j,k3i,j,k 4i,j,ki,j,k 
where subscripts i, j, k, respectively indicate ith country, jth year, and kth governing law.
Yearly amounts to GNP are yearly amounts of bond debts issued by a given country and governed by a given law relative to the given country's GNP. The ratio provides relative amounts of debts in a given governing law. Germany, Japan, and New York are dummy variables that indicate whether the group of bonds is issued respectively under German, Japanese and New York laws. Note that, provided tha t all other laws govern a marginal amount of Euro-bonds, the analysis applies only to bonds that are issued under England, Germany, Japan and New York laws. Moreover, the benchmark law is England and is not included in the equation. Because of enforcement constraints, I expect Germany and Japan to allow for lower amounts and therefore α 1 and α 2 to be negative. On the other hand, New York is supposedly more costly, although recent jurisprudence has shown that for a well-designed debt (having a "direct impact" on the United States), enforcement power is likely to be alike.
On the other hand, submitting to New York courts will allow the attachment 9 of a larger set of assets since the United States attract a large share of the world economic activity. The prediction of results is therefore uncertain.
The Debt to GNP variable is calculated as the total outstanding debts of public entities in the issuing country relative to the country GNP. All macroeconomic variables are obtained from the World Bank databank Global Development Finance. The ratio is aimed to include a 9 Attachment of assets is the lawful seizure of property and placing it under the control of the court.
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debt indicator in the model. I expect that the debt to GNP ratio has a positive impact on the amounts issued under each governing laws.
Data sampling and description
The data is collected from various issues 14 Switzerland (five observations). However these governing can be viewed as marginal laws with a trivial 3.1% share. These results are identical to Eichengreen and Mody (2000b) .
Surprisingly, in constant dollars volumes, New York law governs the largest share of public debts. 11 The next section reports the results regarding the analysis of the credit availability by governing law.
Results

5.a. Is the governing law designed so to enhance the enforcement power?
Table IV presents a group analysis of the governing laws and the related listing markets and currencies of denomination. In particular, I look at the number of sovereign bonds denominated in the currency of the governing law and/or listed in the jurisdiction of the governing law. As detailed in section 2, it matters for the forum conveniens and the eligibility of bond for sovereignty restrictions. I also look at the Rule of Law rating provided by la Porta et al. (1997) for national law enforcement (see Table 1 ). Note that marginal governing laws (namely Austria, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland) are associated either with the currency or the country of the listing market.
Interestingly
Interestingly, Luxembourg is the place of listing of a majority of tradable debts but the Luxembourg law governs seven contracts only. This is consistent with practitioners' analysis (e.g. Yianni (1999) and Rhodes (2001) ).
Therefore, I find evidence that the governing law is not randomly designed. Instead, all bond loans governed by a given law are either denominated in the currency of the jurisdiction of the governing law or listed in this country. This provides evidence that the legal framework to some extent helps enforce contract terms of repayment.
5.b. Jurisdiction shopping and foreign credits availability
The second part of the investigation concerns the amounts raised by the countries under the different governing laws. Independently of the size of the country, the amounts raised under different laws should matter if the credit-rationing hypothesis holds. The sample includes 322 bonds issued between January 1987 and December 1997. Descriptive results are presented in Table VII. I find average individual amounts relative to GNP are lower in German and Japan laws (0.24% of GNP), while New York law allows raising larger amounts on average at every issue (0.85%). England is in between at 0.57%. The debt creditworthiness indicator hardly is a factor of choice of governing law. Namely, more indebted countries would not issue under 16 any specific law. For any governing law, the average ratio of outstanding debts to GNP of issuing countries is close to 40%. Therefore, laws do not catch specific types of debtors according to creditworthiness.
I estimate Equation (1) using the ordinary-least squares method. results are reported in gives the creditors higher chance of success of the seizure of the defaulter's assets.
Therefore, I find evidence that the governing law matters. The investigation however bears its limitation. I suspect it should be extended to take account for other factors such as asset seizure. For instance, the right-hand side of equation (1) may include other variables such as the sum of exports and imports vis-à-vis each of the governing law country.
Moreover, the renegotiation process of bonds is essential as well, and therefore it should be taken into account in a subsequent study.
Concluding remarks
The paper explored whether the enforcement of governing laws of sovereign bonds are credible threats and whether they vary among major laws. Indeed, an essential difference among governing laws is their respective repayment enforcement power and costs. If policy makers decide to standardize collective actions in contracts or laws, the former will nevertheless subsist with hazardous consequences on the new frameworks. To the extent of my knowledge, this paper is the first one that addresses the heterogeneity of creditors rights 17 protections in sovereign bonds. My findings yield important implications for the future reforms.
I find that the governing law is a credible enforcement device. The analysis is based on the selection process of the governing law. I find the jurisdiction is determined by a set of factors that will imply effectiveness of the enforcement of the sovereign defaulter. The second result is that sovereign liabilities are larger when governed by the UK and US law. The main implication of these findings is that there actually exists a legal threat that looks credible. In line with Rose (2002) , this provides additional evidence to Bulow and Rogoff (1989) that predicts the existence of a "stick" to explain the presence of sovereign debts contracted from private creditors.
Therefore, if collective action clauses were widely implemented, I suspect no unbalanced bargaining powers among creditors due to varying governing laws enforcement powers. I therefore believe that the CAC should be promptly implemented as a major step toward the fully efficient international sovereign capital markets.
The study should be regarded as the first analysis of the governing laws of sovereign tradable borrowings that draws new avenues of research. One valuable extension is the analysis of the determinants of the portfolio of governing laws the sovereign debtor holds at every year's end. The jurisdiction shopping is likely to respond to macroeconomic indicators of creditworthiness, which should be interesting to investigate further. I believe having only one governing law versus diversifying the portfolio of governing laws is also a strategic choice of the sovereign debtors. Moreover, UK and US laws vary in the way repayment terms are modifiable (e.g. voting majority versus unanimity). The impact of such a settlement difference deserves further analysis as well, e.g. combining the analysis of the volumes of issues with returns. Table VI Regression estimates
The table reports the impact of the governing law on the funds available yearly relative to GNP in the period, January 1987 to December 1997. The dependent variable is the sum of primary issues of bonds for a given country relative to GNP (in percentage). The country dummies, Germany, Japan, and New York, are dummy variables that take 1 if the group of bonds is governed respectively by Germany, Japan and New York laws, 0 otherwise. England law is the omitted dummy variable and therefore is the benchmark. Debt to GNP is the indicator of creditworthiness of the issuing country. 
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